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Preface
Pension funds have taken a big hit during the current financial
crisis, with losses in the trillions of dollars. In addition, both pri-
vate and public pensions are experiencing significant funding
shortfalls, as is the U.S. government’s Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation, which insures the defined-benefit pension plans of
private companies.
Yeva Nersisyan and Senior Scholar L. Randall Wray argue
that the employment-based pension system is highly problem-
atic, since the strategy for managing pension funds leads to
excessive cost and risk in an effort to achieve above-average
returns. The average fund manager, however, will only achieve
the risk-free return. The authors therefore advocate expanding
Social Security and encouraging private and public pensions to
invest only in safe (risk-free) Treasury bonds, which, on average,
will beat the net returns on risky assets. According to Nersisyan
and Wray, the best solution is to eliminate government support
for pension plans and private savings, and to ensure that anyone
who qualifies for Social Security will be rewarded with a com-
fortable retirement. And since Social Security is a federal gov-
ernment program, it cannot become insolvent.
In the early postwar period, Treasuries comprised a large por-
tion of public and private pension plan portfolios, until factors
such as competition and bankruptcies endangered firms’ ability to
meet pension liabilities and threatened the survival of “legacy”
firms (and associated pensions). In response, firms sought higher
rewards by investing in relatively higher-risk financial instruments
such as corporate bonds, equities, and mutual funds.
Nersisyan and Wray point out that pension funds are part of
what Hyman P. Minsky called “managed money,” and that these
funds are huge relative to the U.S. economy. They are large enough
to destabilize asset prices (e.g., the boom and bust in the com-
modities markets) and any financial market they are allowed to
enter. The willingness of government and employers to allow pen-
sion fund managers to risk retirement accounts meant that work-
ers were subject to the whims of these money managers, and to
the lack of government oversight and protection of these accounts.
Innovations such as securitization, plus leverage, led to
exceedingly risky positions in assets that ultimately collapsed. In
order to restore funding levels, managed money has tried to con-
tinually innovate and speculate on new kinds of assets. Thus,
financial firms on Wall Street not only create and market complex
(risky) instruments but also design “risk management” instru-
ments to hedge and diversify the risk, in addition to selling com-
modity futures indexes (to satisfy the demand they have created)
and a host of other products. Workers are left with fees that drain
their pension funds, and with massive counterparty risk. By
charging fees for all of these instruments, the financial firms
ensure that pension funds will, on average, net less than a risk-
free return. 
The financial industry can be justified only if pension fund
management can beat the average risk-free return on Treasuries
(including industry compensations), but this standard cannot
be met, say the authors. Therefore, workers would be better off
if they and their employers were required to return to a portfo-
lio of safer, longer-maturity assets such as Treasuries, which are
automatically backed by the U.S. government. This approach
would require a very small management staff, and would negate
the use of fund managers and Wall Street sales staff. 
As always, I welcome your comments.
Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, President
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The Trouble with Pensions
No one needs to be reminded that pension funds have taken a big
hit over the course of the financial crisis. Private pensions have
gone from being 109 percent funded in 2007 to 79 percent funded
in 2008—meaning that the value of accumulated assets falls
short of meeting promised payouts of defined-benefit pension
plans by more than one-quarter, amounting to a $400 billion
shortfall. The shortfall in public pensions provided by state and
local governments is estimated to run as high as $2 trillion. By
any reasonable accounting standard, the Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) is troubled because its reserves
will be wiped out by the failure of just a couple large firms on
“legacy” pensions. There has been a long-term trend to convert
defined-benefit plans to defined-contribution plans—which
means that workers and retirees take all the risks. Indeed, this is
often the outcome for “legacy” defined-benefit plans that require
bailouts. In spite of some attempts to improve the management
and transparency of pension funds, it is likely that the PBGC
itself will need a government bailout, and that retirees now face
a more difficult future.
In this policy brief we examine how we got into this mess—
and how deep the hole is. More important, we argue that the cur-
rent approach to managing pension funds leads to excessive cost
and risk, both for covered individuals and for society as a whole.
We advocate a different approach, one that would rely more
heavily on government support for retirement through expan-
sion of Social Security.
How Did We Get into This Mess?
It is important to understand how we got into this predicament.
During World War II, government wanted to hold down wages
to prevent inflation, given that much of the nation’s productive
activity was oriented toward the war. Unions and employers
negotiated postponed payment in the form of pensions, which
pleased all three parties: big firms, big government, and big
unions. Unions got to deliver decent retirement income to mem-
bers—a useful recruiting tool. Government promoted this with
tax advantages for contributions to pensions, and by pushing
spending into the postwar years it reduced inflationary pressure.
And firms loved postponing costs to an indefinite future: rather
than paying wages, they would promise to pay pensions 30 or 40
years down the road. Much of the promise was either unfunded
or met by stock in the firm. This meant that pensions could be
paid only if the firm were successful for a very long time. In those
heady days of industry’s domination by powerful American oli-
gopolists, that seemed a fairly safe bet. After all, it was the era of
John Kenneth Galbraith’s New Industrial State, when it appeared
that the coalition of government, business, and labor interests
could ensure preservation of market share and maintain the
power both to set wages and to set prices at a level to cover wages
and benefits such as pensions. 
Unfortunately, that did not last as long as many thought it
would. Competition (especially foreign) chipped away at mar-
ket power, while bankruptcies, downsizing, and leveraged merg-
ers and acquisitions endangered firms’ ability to meet pension
liabilities. As time went on and it became apparent that “legacy”
firms might not survive for the necessary half century (or more),
unions and government felt that a mere promise to pay pensions
would not suffice. Firms would have to kick in a huge amount of
cash to fully fund the pensions—something the corporations
were loathe to do. The grand compromise was that firms would
increase funding a bit, and government would provide insurance
through the PBGC. Effectively, Uncle Sam was going to be on the
hook for any underfunding. Funding did increase, although the
more frequent and more severe crises experienced after 1970
always wiped out enough assets in each crash to cause pension
funding to dip below prudent levels. Only a financial bubble
could get them back to full funding. To make matters worse, firms
were allowed to reduce contributions during speculative bubbles
(since asset values would be rising), thus ensuring that the funds
would face a crisis whenever the economy was not bubbling.
Obviously, the riskiest portfolio would be one that was
invested in the employer—effectively doubling down the bet that
the firm would not face financial difficulties. Hence, a move to
diversify was under way. 
In the early postwar period, safe Treasuries comprised a
huge portion of private pension plan portfolios, as shown in
Figure 1. In the first years after the war, private pensions held
nearly 50 percent of their assets in Treasuries and almost all the
rest in corporate and foreign bonds. However, Treasuries were
sold off, and corporate bonds, usually considered safer than equi-
ties, were largely replaced with the latter over the course of the
1960s. In recent years, equities plus mutual funds (indirect own-
ership of equities) represented the vast majority of holdings.Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 5
Figure 2 shows the allocation of public pension funds. Here the
story is slightly different: it took these funds longer to divest
themselves of Treasuries (although the share allocated to
Treasuries increased again to a peak of 20 percent around 1990),
and they were slower to move into equities. Still, at the recent
peak, equities and mutual funds accounted for about two-thirds
of assets even among public pensions. 
The total volume of pension funds has grown rapidly in the
postwar period, especially since the late 1970s, and is now huge
relative to the size of the economy (and relative to the size of
financial assets). Figure 3 shows private and public pension funds
relative to GDP. Together, they have climbed to about 70 percent
of GDP. As alluded to above, there has been a trend toward
replacing defined benefits with defined contributions, as shown
in Figure 4.
Defined-contribution plans such as 401(k)s were initially
set up as supplements to other sources of retirement income,
namely Social Security and employer-sponsored defined-benefit
plans. But being much cheaper (and less risky) for employers
than defined-benefit plans, by 1996 they had surpassed the lat-
ter. Today, 401(k)s and individual retirement accounts (IRAs)
have become a major source of retirement income for many
Americans. Currently, 55 million Americans are covered under
defined-contribution plans, with assets reaching about $4 trillion
at the peak of the market (Ashworth 2009). Even the companies
that used to offer defined-benefit plans have used the current cri-
sis to either stop offering them to new employees or to freeze
them for existing ones (EBRI 2009). 
This has placed almost the entire burden of saving for retire-
ment on workers, as there is no law requiring employers to match
employee contributions to 401(k)s. Moreover, a study by Watson
Wyatt found that defined-contribution plans have been continu-
ously underperforming defined-benefit plans by an average of 1
percentage point per year since 1995 (Watson Wyatt Insider2009).
From 2007 to 2008, defined-contribution plans lost over $1.06
trillion on their assets, with corporate equities and mutual funds
contributing $1.03 trillion to the losses (FRB 2009). 
* Includes unallocated insurance contracts, contributions receivable, and 
other assets 
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Figure 2 State and Local Government Employee Retirement 
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Employees that are enrolled in 401(k)s are usually presented
with a menu of investment alternatives that they may choose
from. The Pension Protection Act of 2006 amended the 1974
Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) to give
participants the opportunity to “exercise control over the invest-
ment of assets in their plan accounts”(DoL 2008). A participant
is considered to have exercised control over assets if the plan’s
fiduciary invests them in one of the qualified default investment
alternatives (QDIAs), unless otherwise directed by the benefici-
ary.1
The amendment offers three types of QDIAs: life-cycle or
targeted-retirement-date funds, balanced funds, and profession-
ally managed accounts. One characteristic that unites all three
of these alternatives is that they move away from stand-alone,
fixed-income capital preservation vehicles and toward alterna-
tives that provide for capital appreciation as well as capital
preservation. In other words, they are riskier but supposedly offer
higher returns. 
Employees can choose the so-called “life cycle” or “target
date” alternative, which becomes more conservative as the retire-
ment age nears. However, the Wall Street Journal reports that
fund companies have “raced to roll out target-date products,
often stuffing them with their own pricey mutual funds and
adding an extra layer of fees on top” (cited in Laise 2009). But
even this investment alternative, which is the most conservative
of the three QDIAs, can be very volatile, as it can include a large
proportion of stocks. This is the main reason why target-date
fund assets lost 32 percent of their value on average last year, with
funds due to lose about 25 percent in 2010 (Laise 2009). EBRI
has estimated that it could take two to five years for 401(k) bal-
ances to return to their January 2008 levels, assuming a 5 per-
cent equity rate of return (Wharton School 2009). 
A simulation by Boston College’s retirement-research center
demonstrated that even if a worker had contributed 6 percent of
his pay to a 401(k) plan for 40 years, had invested in a target-date
fund, had never borrowed from the fund until retirement, and had
invested in annuities at retirement, he could only replace 28 per-
cent of his preretirement income, if he retired in 2008 (Laise 2009). 
The recent decline of asset values both in absolute terms as
well as relative to GDP has been historically large. The following
numbers give some idea of the significance of the problems faced
by pensions. Private plans (defined contribution and defined
benefit) lost about $1.79 trillion of their financial assets between
2007 and 2008, with equities and mutual fund shares losing $1.82
trillion. As a share of GDP, private pensions fell by nearly 14 per-
centage points between 2007 and 2008. The Millman 100
Pension Funding Index, which tracks the nation’s 100 largest
defined-benefit plans, reported a decline in the funding ratio
from 99.6 percent to 71.7 percent (FPA 2009). Public plans fell by
about 9 percentage points of GDP. IRAs (another form of tax-
advantaged retirement savings) have lost $1.1 trillion, bringing
total losses of private retirement funds to about $2.9 trillion
(FRB 2009). 
The outlook becomes even grimmer as we look into the
finances of the PBGC, which insures defined-benefit private pen-



































































Figure 4 Defined-contribution vs. Defined-benefit Plans,
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pension plans is similar to that of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) and commercial banks. Private pension
plans pay premiums to the PBGC in return for its taking over
payments when plans go bad, up to a monthly limit set annually
under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).
The PBGC’s funding comes from returns on invested assets and
current premium inflows, as well as the assets of the bankrupt
pension plans and anything it recovers from the plan sponsors. 
The PBGC’s total benefit payments increased to $4.48 bil-
lion in 2009, while another $168 billion’s worth of plans, those
whose sponsors had credit ratings below investment grade or
were in financial distress, were classified as possible terminations.
This was up from the 2008 total of $47 billion (PBGC 2009). 
Although the PBGC has enough liquidity to meet its com-
mitments for the next several years, it is underfunded in the long
term, and none of its programs has sufficient funds to meet their
long-term obligations. The single-employer program, for exam-
ple, had assets of over $68.7 billion, with liabilities increasing to
$89.8 billion in 2009. The multiemployer program was also
underfunded, with over $1.4 billion in assets and $2.3 billion in
“present value of nonrecoverable future financial assistance”
(PBGC 2009). This makes the PBGC $22 billion short of funds,
double the 2008 level, or about 76 percent funded. 
We want to be clear here: the PBGC is a government oper-
ation, like the FDIC, and as such it cannot go bankrupt. Rather,
its long-term funding deficit or its shortfall of inflows can always
be made up by Treasury payments. The point is that private as
well as public (state and local) pensions are in trouble, and
exactly how they will be bailed out will ultimately be determined
by the Congress. There is no reason to believe that the bailout
will be dollar for dollar. This means that retirees will suffer. And
let us remind readers that retirees will suffer not because of mis-
takes they have made but rather from pension shortfalls that are
due to the “grand compromise” that allowed employers to only
partially fund pensions, to the government’s unwillingness to
fully guarantee pensions, and to the government’s and employ-
ers’ willingness to allow pension fund managers to take risks with
workers’ retirements. Indeed, even if workers had wanted to
invest their pension funds in a safer manner, most of them would
not have been able to make such a choice. In truth, they were
subject to the whims of money managers chosen by firms, plus
the lack of government oversight and protection of their funds.
Obviously, pension funds suffer when financial markets
crash. It is important to understand, however, that this is a two-
way street: pension funds have become so large that they are
capable of literally “moving markets.” As they flow into a new
class of assets, the sheer volume of funds under management will
tend to cause prices to rise. Pension funds often follow a strategy
through which they will allocate a percentage of funds to a par-
ticular asset class. This can occur on a “follow the leader” basis as
the popularity of investing in a new asset class increases, pushing
up prices and rewarding the decision. To increase portfolio
returns, managers might decide to increase the allocation to well-
performing classes of assets. This could contribute to a specula-
tive bubble. Of course, trying to reverse flows—to move out of an
asset class—will cause prices to fall, rapidly.
A good example is the commodities boom and bust during
the aughts, and today’s boomlet—which might be coming to an
end. As explained in Wray 2008, the deregulation at the end of
the 1990s allowed pension managers to invest in commodities
for the first time. Previously, pensions could not buy commodi-
ties because these are purely speculative bets. There is no return
to holding commodities unless their prices rise—indeed, hold-
ing them is costly. However, Goldman Sachs (which created one
of the two largest indexes) and others promoted investment in
commodities as a hedge, on the argument that commodity prices
are uncorrelated with equities. In the aftermath of the dot-com
collapse, that was appealing. In truth, when managed money flows
into an asset class that had previously been uncorrelated with
other assets, that asset will become correlated. Hence, by market-
ing commodity indexes as uncorrelated assets, a commodities
bubble ensued that would collapse along with everything else. This
is because when one asset class collapses—say, securitized mort-
gages—holders need to come up with cash and collateral to cover
losses, which causes them to sell holdings in other asset classes.
This is why silver and cattle became correlated when the Hunt
brothers’ attempt to corner the silver market failed: they had to
sell their cows in order to cover their losses on silver. 
We will not repeat the analysis in Wray 2008, but in brief,
most of the position taken was actually in commodity futures
indexes, as pension funds decided to allocate, say, 5 percent of
assets under management to commodities. However, there is a
close link between index prices and spot prices. While pensions
allocated only a small proportion of portfolios to these indexes,
this amounted to a huge volume relative to the size of commod-
ity markets. For example, Mike W. Masters, managing member /
portfolio manager of Masters Capital Management, LLC, testi-
fying before the Permanent Committee on Homeland SecurityPublic Policy Brief, No. 109 8
and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, showed that the
allocation by pension funds (and other index speculators, with
pensions accounting for about 85 percent of all index specula-
tion) to oil was equivalent to the total growth of Chinese demand
for oil for the half decade following 2004. Index and spot prices
literally exploded, in what was probably the biggest commodities
price bubble ever experienced. 
The bubble was also fueled by a policy change. As pension
funds poured into commodities and commodity futures, driv-
ing up the price of energy, metals, and food, Congress mandated
biofuels use—which added to pressures on food prices and con-
tributed to starvation around the globe. When pensions started
to move out of commodities in the late summer and fall of 2008
(pulling about one-third of their funds), prices collapsed; oil
prices fell from about $150 a barrel to $40. Because other asset
classes have performed poorly in recent months, pensions briefly
moved back in, and commodities prices regained some ground.
While it is too early to tell, it looks like this little boomlet may
have come to an end—probably not because pensions have
moved out again but rather because demand for the actual com-
modities remains sluggish in the face of the global downturn.
The point, however, is that pension funds are big enough to
destabilize asset prices.
More generally, pension funds are part of what Hyman P.
Minsky called “managed money,” and it could be argued that the
global financial crisis really resulted from the way that managed
money operates (Wray 2009). Again, this is a huge topic, and
beyond the scope of this policy brief. But in short, huge flows of
managed money have built up over the postwar period. These
seek the highest total return, and in many cases use high leverage
ratios to increase return. Innovation plus leverage led to exceed-
ingly risky positions in assets that finally collapsed, beginning in
the market for securitized subprime loans. Pensions are just one
component of managed money, which also includes hedge funds,
sovereign wealth funds, and university endowments. Managed
money is a large and growing portion of the financial sector, as
shown in Figure 5.
What is most important to see is that commercial banking
had been becoming increasingly irrelevant for some time, as had
other traditional lines of business such as thrifts and credit unions.
Securitized products—agency and government-sponsored-
enterprise (GSE) pools included—and managed money had
taken over. Just before the current global crisis hit, pension fund-
ing was, on average, doing well—thanks to the speculative bub-
ble. The crash caused the current underfunding. In order to
restore funding levels, pensions need a new asset bubble. Indeed,
pensions are looking into placing bets on death through the so-
called “life settlements” market, securitized life insurance poli-
cies that pay off when people die early (Auerback and Wray
2009). Ironically, this would be a sort of doubling down on the
death of retirees, since early death reduces the amount of time that
pensions have to be paid, even as it increases pension fund assets. 
Pension funds are so large that they will bubble-up any
financial market they are allowed to enter—and what goes up
must come down. The problem really is that managed money,
taken as a whole, is simply too large to be supported by the
nation’s ability to produce the output and income necessary to
provide a foundation for the financial assets and debts that exist
even in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Hence, returns can-
not be obtained by making loans against production (or even
income); rather, they can be generated only by “financialization,”
or layering and leveraging existing levels of production and income.
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This is why the ratio of financial assets and debts grows continu-
ally—and why managed money has to continually innovate new
kinds of assets in which to speculate. Figures 6 and 7 are instructive,
showing a debt level that is growing much faster than GDP.
Before we conclude this section, it is worth noting the sim-
ilarities between the U.S. health care system and its pension sys-
tem. Firms also offered health care as a tax-advantaged benefit in
lieu of wage increases. Over time, this became our current “man-
aged care” system. Like pension funds that are controlled by
money managers, our health care is largely managed by highly
oligopolized financial firms run by well-compensated executives
(with Medicare and Medicaid providing a third leg—much as
Social Security is the third leg of the retirement stool). In this
case, these financial firms are insurance companies. Workers have
little control over their health care or their pensions, which are
frequently chosen by employers. Workers are not really “sover-
eign consumers” in this case because they have neither the
knowledge nor (usually) the ability to shop around for health
care or pensions—in both cases, employers negotiate with
providers and pass fees along to workers. With others in control,
there is little to hold down costs—even as wages are sacrificed
on the argument that workers are receiving valuable nonwage
compensation. Pensions are threatened by underfunding, by the
transition to defined contribution, and by a declining propor-
tion of the workforce that is covered. Likewise, the number of
workers (and others) without health care coverage has been rising,
while even those who are covered face exclusions, denial of care in
the case of preexisting conditions, and higher premiums and copay-
ments. The health care “reform” under way in Washingtoncould be
seen as a partial answer, or as a further financialization of health
care through mandates that individuals must buy insurance—
effectively turning over more of the national income to financial
institutions (in this case, insurance companies). Those with decent
pensions face taxes on “Cadillac” policies, with higher copays and
more exclusions to follow.
Pension Fund Strategy
In this section we turn to the strategy followed by pension fund
managers. Essentially, each manager has a strong incentive to
meet or beat the average return of pension funds, or face getting
fired. Of course, except in Garrison Keillor’s Lake Wobegone, not
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Note: Prior to 1945, net public and net private debts are used (as defined by the 
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about total financial liabilities provided by the Flow of Funds Accounts. Data 
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Figure 7 Credit Market Debt Outstanding by Sector, 
1945–2008 (in percent of GDP) 
Source: Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts Public Policy Brief, No. 109 10
everyone can be above average—but that does not stop every-
one from trying. 
There are two fundamental principles widely believed to
operate in financial markets: the risk-return relation and the effi-
cient markets hypothesis. Higher risk is rewarded with higher
returns; hence, fund managers must take on more risk to get the
reward of above-average returns. But since higher returns only
reward higher risk (and thus, higher losses), with competitive mar-
kets the average fund manager will only receive the risk-free return.
The higher returns of the brighter or luckier managers will be off-
set by the lower returns of the dumber or less lucky ones.
With efficient markets, prices reflect all available informa-
tion. Hence, there really is no reward for skill when it comes to
managing pension funds, so it boils down to above-average luck.
In other words, if your fund manager does not come from the
lucky land of Lake Wobegone, pensions would do just as well by
investing in riskless Treasury bonds (plus, perhaps, the highest-
rated state, municipal, and corporate bonds—essentially what
pensions did in the initial period following World War II). 
Indeed, a simple strategy of buying Treasuries should do
better than the average managed pension because hiring an
above-average fund manager would require above-average com-
pensation—so even those funds with B-rated managers would
probably provide lower net returns than Treasuries. To be sure,
there is some shuffling of the deck, so that one manager with a
run of good luck can beat the average for a while, but she will
probably fail and wipe out several years’ worth of winnings in
one swoop as some other lucky manager takes her place in the
Wall Street lottery. Only the fortunate few can permanently live
in Lake Wobegone and thereby beat Treasuries over the long
run—and so deserve the higher management fees.
To be fair, these two principles may not be entirely correct—
or, there could be other forces at play that allow for a positive
return to risk even after subtracting losses. If so, that would go
against the conventional wisdom that has been driving Wall
Street. It does seem plausible that over long periods of time mar-
kets do tend to push risk-adjusted returns toward equality, so
that, on average, safe Treasuries will beat net returns on risky
assets. There is, however, a positive return to taking illiquid posi-
tions. And all things being equal, it is probable that longer-term
maturities (more technically, long-duration maturities) receive 
a premium. Still, when all is said and done, pension managers
that follow similar strategies, including taking positions in
traded, liquid assets, will push risk spreads toward to the point
that they just compensate for expected losses due to risk and
illiquidity.
Each time there is a financial crisis, the funds tank and man-
agers look for strategies to reduce risk. Enter Wall Street sales
staff with an array of instruments to hedge and diversify the risk.
There is one sure bet when it comes to gambling: the house
always wins. In financial markets, the institutions that create and
market complex financial instruments are the house, and they
always win—as Satyajit Das (2006) and Richard Bookstaber
(2007) show. Even if we leave to the side their ability to dupe and
defraud pension fund managers, these institutions charge fees
for all of the instruments they are selling. This ensures that pen-
sion funds will on average net less than a risk-free return. But
wherever high finance intrudes, sucker bets and fraud usually
exist. So the average return should be way below that of
Treasuries, and even the lucky managers from Lake Wobegone
will probably net less than the risk-free return. 
To recap the argument to this point: pension fund managers
assume risk on the assumption that with higher risk comes
higher returns. Financial institutions manufacture risky assets
such as securitized subprime mortgages, or even more esoteric
collateralized debt obligations, or CDOs, cubed. It then con-
vinces pension funds that they ought to diversify to reduce risk,
for example by gambling on commodities. And under ERISA,
pension fund managers have to diversify: “A fiduciary shall 
discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of
the participants and beneficiaries and . . . by diversifying 
the investments of the plan so as to minimize the risk of large
losses, unless under the circumstances it is clearly prudent not 
to do so” (ERISA 1974, § 1104 [a]). By coincidence, Wall Street
institutions are marketing commodity futures indexes to satisfy 
the demand they have created. Wall Street also provides a wide
array of complex hedging strategies to shift risk, as well as credit
default “insurance” and buy-back assurances in case anything
goes wrong.
Ironically, if all of these “risk management” strategies were
completely successful, the pension fund would achieve a risk-free
portfolio. Of course, it could have achieved this much more
directly if it had bypassed Wall Street entirely and gone straight
to the Treasury. However, Wall Street would then have had a
reduced market for the risky assets and hedges it was pushing,
and pension fund managers would not have received their gen-
erous compensations for engaging in complex and risky trades
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that drain their pension funds, and with massive counterparty
risk as the hedges, insurance, and assurance go bad.
An Alternative Public Policy Strategy
As mentioned above, we reward pensions with tax advantages
and government guarantees. Before this crisis, as we have shown,
private pension fund assets reached about 50 percent of GDP,
and state and local government pension fund assets reached
almost 25 percent. With assets equal to three-quarters of national
output, these funds represent a huge industry that owes its exis-
tence at least in part to government support. It has created a lot
of well-compensated jobs for managers, as well as the financial
institutions that manufacture and sell the assets purchased. 
In a sense, the entire industry can be justified only if through
skill or luck pension fund management can beat the average risk-
free return on Treasuries by enough that it can pay out all of
those industry compensations plus add growth to the fund port-
folio. Yet the expectation should be that fund managers are sig-
nificantly less skilled and less “lucky” than, say, the highly
compensated employees of the financial institutions they are
dealing with. Hence, workers would be far better off if their
employers were required to fully fund pensions with investments
restricted to Treasury debt.  At most, each pension plan would
require a very small management staff that would log on to
www.treasurydirect.gov to transfer funds out of the employing
firm’s bank deposit and into Treasuries, in an amount determined
by actuarial tables plus nominal benefits promised. Unlike pricing
packaged subprime loans and derivatives, this is not rocket sci-
ence. Good-bye, fund managers and Wall Street sales staff.
Indeed, this raises the question, should the federal govern-
ment promote and protect pensions at all? Surely, individuals
should be free to place savings with fund managers of their
choice, and each saver can try to find that above-average manager
from Lake Wobegone. But it makes no sense to promote a
scheme that cannot succeed on average at the aggregate level—
the typical fund manager probably cannot beat the average, so
there is no strong reason to believe that managed funds will pro-
vide a net return that is above the return on U.S. Treasuries. It
would be far better to remove the tax advantages and govern-
ment guarantees provided to pension plans, and instead allow
individuals to put their savings directly into Treasuries that are
automatically government-backed and provide a risk-free return.
Perhaps this sort of saving should still enjoy tax-advantaged 
status—but we remain ambivalent about tax-advantaged saving.
It is not clear that there is a strong public purpose in promoting
private saving—which, after all, is a deduction from aggregate
demand and hence generates a bias toward demand gaps and
slow economic growth.
Is there a better alternative that would allow us to provide a
safe, secure, and decent living for our retirees? 
The U.S. retirement system is supposed to rest on a three-
legged stool: pensions, individual savings, and Social Security.
Pensions are mostly employer-related and are now seriously under-
funded (and the general trend is toward defined-contribution
plans, which make no promises about the level of retirement
benefits or the living standard that will be provided). There are
also huge and growing administrative problems posed by the
transformation of the American workplace—with the typical
worker switching jobs many times over the course of her career,
and with the lifespan of the typical firm measured in years rather
than decades. This makes the employer-based pension system
less suited to current and future realities. And, finally, as dis-
cussed here, the most plausible long-term net return on man-
aged money would be somewhat below the risk-free return on
Treasuries. 
The problem with private saving is that Americans do not
save enough for their retirement. They never have. That is why
government created Social Security, and why unions pushed for
pensions. Even if individuals tried to do so, there is no reason to
believe that they would achieve better returns than pension fund
managers. Worse, they could be duped out of their savings by
unscrupulous financial institutions selling risky investments. 
Thus, the best solution would be to eliminate government
support for pension plans and private saving, and instead boost
Social Security to ensure that anyone who works long enough to
qualify will achieve a comfortable retirement. Certainly, individ-
uals are free to supplement this with private savings, according to
ability and desires. And employers, unions, and employees can
continue to negotiate pensions, as desired—but without public
subsidies and guarantees.
We anticipate two main objections. First, such a scheme
could put a lot of money managers and financial advisers out of
business. True. The U.S. financial system is still far too big even
after the crisis. In our view, it makes no economic sense to send
as much as 40 percent of corporate profits to the finance, insur-
ance, and real estate (FIRE) sector, as we did at the peak of the
bubble—and we seem to be restoring the sector’s share evenPublic Policy Brief, No. 109 12
now—as it “Hoovers” up a record share of profits again. As
Figure 8 shows, over the course of the boom the financial sector’s
profits grew rapidly relative to GDP, and while the crash wiped out
profits, in recent quarters the financial sector has rallied.2
Second, there is a concerted effort to convince Americans
that Social Security is broke; hence, our proposal to ramp up
benefits will be met with criticism and perhaps even fear.
However, Social Security is a federal government program, and
as such it cannot become insolvent. All payments can be made as
they come due, even if benefits become more generous. We will
not explain here why this is so because there have been a great
many Levy Institute publications over the years that provide the
details (see in particular Papadimitriou and Wray 1999). 
We close with a statement of hope, that some common sense
can be brought to bear on the problems facing both private and
public pensions. This crisis has brought home the vulnerability
that is always just below the surface. And longer-term trends that
will surely continue mean that, even without financial crises, the
employment-based pension system is highly problematic. Finally,
we have questioned the wisdom of current strategy regarding
management of pension funds, arguing that it makes most sense
to return to a portfolio of longer maturity and safe financial assets
such as U.S. Treasuries. This should provide safety without sacri-
ficing net return—especially if we use Social Security to provide
this safe retirement. No accumulation of financial assets will be
required to back up Social Security, since the full faith and credit
of the U.S. government stands behind the promised benefits. That
is exactly what stands behind U.S. Treasuries, so there is no rea-
son for a ramped-up pension plan using funds to accumulate
Treasuries. All we need is a strengthened Social Security program
with a government guarantee behind the promised benefits.
Notes
1.  A QDIA must be diversified so as to minimize the risk of
large losses; it may not invest participant contributions
directly in employer securities (DoL 2008).
2.  Profits relative to GDP are indexed to 100 in the first quar-
ter of 2001; at the peak of the bubble, the financial sector’s
profits relative to GDP had increased by 50 percent. In the
crash, the financial sector’s share fell to less than half of its
2001 value. However, it has now already recovered to its 2001
share. The nonfinancial sector’s profit share also rose in the
boom, but it did not fall nearly so far in the crash—and its
recovery has been far less robust.
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